Two-Process Agent Architecture

MDRwatchdog splits its endpoint agent into two processes. The collector runs as SYSTEM and has access to all kernel events, hardware sensors, and security channels. It writes telemetry to a local named pipe. The shipper runs as a low-privilege isolated user (mdr_isolated_runtime) and reads from the named pipe. The shipper’s network policy restricts egress to HTTPS:443 and DNS only — it cannot initiate connections to any other destination. These two processes never share memory and never share credentials. The collector never touches the network. The shipper never touches privileged system resources.

Blast radius containment means limiting how much damage an attacker can do if they compromise one component of a system. If an attacker compromises the MDRwatchdog shipper process — through a vulnerability in the shipping code or in a dependency — they control a process that can only reach HTTPS:443 and DNS. They cannot pivot to internal systems, cannot read kernel telemetry, cannot access system credentials, and cannot write to protected directories. The blast radius of a shipper compromise is mathematically bounded by the OS-level network policy. No other endpoint security agent architecture provides this property.

The novelty is the combination of: (1) a high-privilege SYSTEM collector and a low-privilege isolated shipper connected exclusively via named pipe; (2) OS-level network egress restriction on the shipper that is mathematically enforced rather than policy-configured; (3) the architecture itself being verified and documented in the tamper-evident audit chain — the shipper’s startup, configuration, and runtime state are sealed as audit events. An assessor can verify that the two-process architecture was running and properly isolated at any given moment. No prior endpoint agent design incorporates all three properties.

The collector writes serialized telemetry events to a Windows named pipe (\\.\ pipe\MDRwatchdog). The shipper reads from the pipe. The pipe is the only inter-process communication channel between the two processes. The collector never writes to the network. The shipper never reads from kernel sources. The named pipe is an OS-level isolation boundary — it cannot be bypassed by either process without OS-level privileges neither process has.

The shipper logs its process startup, user context, network policy state, and pipe connection to the Quantum Audit Chain™. If the shipper starts with the wrong user context, or if the network policy is not in effect, that event is sealed to the chain and flags in the console. An assessor can verify that the two-process architecture was operating correctly at any moment during the assessment period.